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ABSTRACT 
This paper critically reviews the extensive literature on 
retrospective voting in response to economic conditions . Each of the 
major types of analyses which have been performed�time series 
analyses of national vote totals, presidential popularity, and cross-
sectional analyses of individual survey responses�have raised several 
interesting and important questions . The answers which have been 
obtained, however , are only partial and limited, as each of these 
approaches entails serious problems of estimation and interpretation. 
Further progress in this area, we argue , requires explicit treatment 
of conceptual and statistical issues which have hindered previous 
research: the dynamic formulation of expectations and preferences, 
the incidence of policy (and nonpolicy) effects across the population, 
notions of incumbering and political responsibility . 
A RETROSPECTIVE ON RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
D .  Roderick Kiewiet and Douglas Rivers 
And the whole congregation of the children of Israel murmered 
against Hoses and Aaron in the wilderness : And the children of 
Israel said unto them, Would to God we had died by the hand of 
the Lord in the land of Egypt , when we sat by the flesh pots ,  and 
when we did eat bread to the full; for ye have brought us forth 
into this wilderness , to kill this whole assembly of people with 
hunger (Exodus 16 : 2-3 ) . 
1 .  INTRODUCTION 
The idea that a leader's political fate turns upon the 
material well-being of the people he leads is , as this passage from 
the Old Testament indicates,  an old one . To be sure, few economies 
have fluctuated as extremely as that of the Israelites in the
wilderness , and few political figures have experienced as many large 
swings in their popularity as Hoses. Hore recently, though , 
historians have traced the origin of the French Revolution to a series 
of bad harvests followed by increased prices , falling wages, and mass 
unemployment (Doyle , 1 980) . - In Britain, following the expansion of 
the franchise in the early part of the nineteenth century , electoral 
fluctuations were regularly attributed to grain prices and other 
economic factors (Olney , 1 973; Nossiter , 1 97 4) . 
Political observers in the United States also have long 
believed that prevailing economic conditions exert a strong influence 
upon the choices voters make in national elections . Research in this 
area makes up one of the oldest quantitative traditions in political 
science ( for reviews of this early literature see Kramer , 1 97 1 ,  and 
Monroe , 1 97 9 ) .  These studies examined several different conjectures : 
prosperity aids the Republicans; farm sector depressions lead to 
support for the populists; or conservative candidates fare better 
during good times. In short , the vague notion that economic 
conditions influence voting admits to a wide range of specific 
hypotheses. 
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The focus of research in this area narrowed considerably, 
however , following publication of Gerald Kramer's seminal article , 
"Short-Term Fluctuations in U . S. Voting Behavior , 1 896-196 4 , "  in 1 97 1 .  
Following Kramer's lead , most subsequent studies have concentrated on 
a few interrelated hypothese s :  that voting i n  response t o  economic 
concerns is ( 1 )  retrospective, ( 2) incumbency-oriented, and ( 3 )  based 
upon the results of economic policies, and not upon the actual 
policies themselves .  Taken together , these imply that voters give 
greater support to candidates of the incumbent party when the election 
is preceded by a period of prosperity than when times have been poor. 
We will henceforth refer to these interlocking hypotheses as the 
retrospective voting model . 
In some respects the subsequent concentration of work on this 
one model is unfortunate, given that there are other plausible ways 
different types of economic concerns might influence voters• 
decisions . On the whole , however, the narrowing of attention to a few 
potentially testable propositions has been beneficial. Retrospective 
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voting is probably the simplest and most straightforward model of 
those which have been posited ( perhaps also, as suggested above , the 
oldest as well), and it makes good sense to examine simple hypotheses 
before entertaining more complicated theories about political-economic 
relationships. Combined with the fact that most studies in this area 
have utilized much the same data, this concentration on retrospective 
voting has made it much more feasible than in other areas of political 
research to compare the results of different studies , and thus to 
identify the particular features of models and methods which lead to 
differences in findings . 
In the next section of this paper we will review the many time 
series analyses which followed the publication of Kramer's original 
article . We will then turn to an examination of the other major body 
of research on retrospective voting�analyses of individual level 
survey data. In both cases we will identify the more robust findings 
which have emerged from the various strands of research , those 
findings which have not been strongly substantiated, and those 
subjects about which we continue to know virtually nothing. (Although 
much of this research has concerned European and other western style 
democracies, our discussion will be confined to studies of American 
national elections. ) In the fourth and final section, we consider 
pooling cross-section and time series data as a possible solution to 
the data problems encountered in previous studies. 
2 .  TIME SERIES ANALYSES OF RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
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As indicated earlier , the retrospective voting model which has 
informed most of the work in this field can actually be decomposed 
into three separate hypotheses : voting on the basis of economic 
concerns is in response to actual policy outcomes , retrospective, and 
incumbency-oriented . Thus it is useful to analyze these studies in 
terms of the evidence they bring to bear on the following three sets 
of questions: 
1 .  What exactly are the economic outcomes to which voters 
respond? 
2 .  I f  voters judge retrospectively , what is the nature of the 
dynamic relation between policy outcomes and electoral 
responses? 
3. What is the proper incumbency concept? Is it the incumbent 
president , congressional candidates of his party , or some 
other concept of incumbency? 
Retrospective voting can occur on noneconomic issues, but most 
of the literature focuses on economic performance . Employment, 
inflation, and real income are neither perfectly well-defined nor 
measured without error , but their meaning and measurement are better 
understood and less controversial than that of any noneconomic issues. 
So far as possible, we will also limit our attention here to economic 
performance, though this can cause di fficulties since wars--even 
unpopular ones�stimulate the economy without benefiting the incumbent 
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administration. 
Kramer found that the share of the total national vote for 
congressional candidates of the incumbent president's party was 
influenced more strongly and consistently by changes in real per 
capita income than by several other economic variables . Aggregate 
time series analyses of retrospective voting which followed both 
corroborated and extended Kramer's findings . First,  electoral support 
for the incumbent party is best predicted by one of a set of highly 
correlated measures of change in real output . Although most studies 
followed Kramer's lead and specified change in real per capita income 
( Bloom and Price , 1 97 5; Tufte, 1 97 5 ,  1 97 8; Hibbing and Alford, 1 981 ),  
unemployment or change in per capita real GNP appear to work nearly as 
well (Fair, 1 97 8) .  Evidence from this class o f  studies o n  how voters 
react to price inflation is mixed , and appears to be sensitive to 
small changes in data and in specification. 
Another study which examined pooled cross-section time series 
data--state level vote totals for president from approximately a hal f 
dozen presidential elections�reported similar findings . Although 
Meltzer and Vellrath ( 1975) were not impressed by the strength of 
their findings , their analysis indicated that national unemployment 
and price inflation often influenced presidential vote totals . The 
economic data analyzed in all these studies, of course, are national 
level figures . In sharp contrast to the pattern of evidence which has 
emerged here , a study which estimated the effect of price and income 
changes at the level of the individual congressional district found 
these variables to have virtually no impact upon district vote totals 
(Owens and Olsen, 1980). 
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Secondly, voters appear to base their decisions primarily upon 
the economic conditions of the recent past. Again, most studies 
simply followed Kramer's lead and used the year of the election as the 
time frame for their economic measures (this is obviously a bit crude; 
because elections are held in early November, approximately one sixth 
of the data summarized by such measures comes from after the 
election). Fair's (1978) study , however, experimented with several 
different lags. Although there were not enough observations in bis 
time series to permit any firm conclusions, bis evidence suggested 
that votes for president were best predicted by per capita change in 
GNP in the second quarter of the election year. It is also clear that 
averaging the performance indicators over a longer period improves the 
prospects for maintaining the null hypothesis. Stigler (1973) , for 
instance , observed much weaker relationships between per capita income 
change and congressional vote totals when he adopted a two year 
retrospective time frame. 
One problem with the aggregate presidential or congressional 
voting data is that one either bas a very short time series (in the 
case of Tufte's (1975) analysis of post-1946 midterm elections, only 
eight observations!) or the data extend over a period so long that the 
assumed stability of the regression function becomes questionable. 
Over the past century there has been vast change in the structure of 
the economy , in the size and scope of the federal government, in 
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information and communications technology , as well as in the nature of 
party competition that certainly must have affected the way voters 
bold political leaders accountable for economic performance. Even 
though we gain an additional electoral observation every two or four 
years , we also gain a lot of history along with it. 
An alternative approach that allows estimation of more complex 
models is to use the monthly or quarterly Gallup presidential 
popularity series. In keeping with the aggregate voting studies , 
these studies have found that approval ratings of the incumbent 
president are adversely affected by declines in real output (Kernell, 
1978; Rivers, 1980; Golden and Poterba , 1980: Hibbs and Vasilatos, 
1982) and by price inf
.lation (Monroe, 1978; Norpotb , 1984).
At the risk of over-simplification, the typical presidential 
popularity study models voters ' •memories" as a distributed lag of 
past performance indicators. Specifications of the lag function vary 
from study to study. Hibbs et al . (1982) employ a fairly complicated 
geometric structure that involves inter-administration and inter-party 
comparisons. Golden and Poterba (1980) and Monroe (1978) use a 
polynomial distributed lag, while Norpoth (1984) tries short, 
unconstrained forms. Although each of these studies has found lagged 
effects, none, unfortunately, has been particularly informative about 
the nature of the dynamic relation between government performance and 
political evaluations. Part of the problem is in the data: fitting 
two or three different distributed lags to 80 or quarterly 
observations is guaranteed to produce unsatisfactory estimates. The 
solution. of course, is to impose some � priori constraints on the 
retrospective model. Smoothness priors, of which geometric and 
polynomial lags are very strong forms. are one possibility, but we 
should insist that these have a sound theoretical basis (see Nerlove, 
1!177, for a good discussion of theoretically derived lag structures). 
Symptomatic of the theoretical sloppiness that characterizes much of 
this field is the fact that many analyses ignore changes in 
administrations altogether, with the result that poor performance by 
the previous administration hurts the popularity of its successor. 
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It appears that we are still a long way from answering 
important practical questions. such as how close to an election must 
an economic recovery occur to help the incumbent party. Certainly the 
lags which have been found are not long enough to make political 
business cycle manipulations entirely pointless (a rectangular lag 
over the entire term of office would of course eliminate any advantage 
to timing recoveries to coincide with elections). On the other hand, 
most findings in this area indicate that an incumbent would be well 
advised to have a recovery started before the election quarter. 
Whether the optimal timing is two quarters in advance, three quarters, 
or even earlier remains an open question. 
Consideration of the third major aspect of the retrospective 
voting model�defining who the incumbents are--may seem a bit 
pedantic; the studies discussed above have concerned either the 
incumbent president or congressional candidates of his party, and this 
would seem like the obvious way to proceed. There are, however, 
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several variations on· the incumbency theme which are worth noting. 
First, Tufte (1975, 1978) found that change in per capita income 
consistently influenced the electoral fortunes of incumbent party 
congressional candidates in midterm elections. His findings thus 
refute the notion that midterm elections are no more than a regression 
toward the mean, or a return to the "normal vote" following the 
"surge" toward the party of the winning candidate in the preceding 
presidential election (Campbell, 1966). 
Secondly, Hibbing and Alford (1981) argue that all 
congressional incumbents are not created equal; their analysis of 
aggregate time series data suggests that congressional candidates of 
the incumbent president's party who are also incumbent congressmen 
(incumbent incumbents, if you will) are more strongly affected by 
economic fluctuations than are candidates of his party running in open 
seats. Because incumbent incumbents have a very high probability of 
winning reelection, this implies, as Hibbing and Alford note, that 
"the political effects of economic fluctuations, so clear when mean 
vote levels are examined. may lose a good deal of their force when the 
focus is shifted to actual seats won and lost" (p. 438). Although the 
robustness of their findings has been questioned (Fiorina, 1983), this 
remains an important point; for it is the subsequent composition of 
Congress, not national vote percentages , which is presumably of more 
interest as far as public policy is concerned.1
What we have learned from time series analyses of 
retrospective voting is that the electoral fortunes of the incumbent 
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president and congressional candidates of his party, as well as the 
president's approval ratings, are influenced by fluctuations in 
employment, prices, and real output. To a skeptic, it might seem that 
this research has revealed nothing beyond what common sense should 
have told us in the first place. Perhaps, but propositions derived 
from common sense and political folk wisdom are often incorrect or 
contradictory. 
Beyond documenting common sense, however, we now have a rough 
sense, at least, of the magnitude of effects of real income 
fluctuations on voting. Kramer ( 197 1) initially estimated 
approximately that a 0 . 5" ( ±0.2�)2 decline in the incumbent party's 
congressional vote share would follow a one percent loss of real 
income. Bloom and Price ( 197 5) found a slightly larger effect for 
income declines (approximately 0 .7 �  ±0 .2�). but no evidence of any 
effect for income gains. Tufte (197 5) ,  controlling for presidential 
popularity which also depends on real income changes, estimated a 
0.3 �  C±0 .1�) vote loss for every one percent of real income lost. 
Somewhat larger effects are found on presidential votes. Fair ( 197 8)
estimated roughly point for point ( 1 .2� ±0 . 4�) changes in presidential 
vote shares and percentage real income growth rates. With stable 
prices, Frey and Schneider find that a one percent increase in real 
income raises presidential popularity about 0 . 85� ( ±0 .3 �) while Hibbs 
et al. ( 1982),  controlling for unemployment, find that a one percent 
loss in real income eventually costs the incumbent about 0 . 8'1>  in 
popularity. Of course, Stigler ( 197 3 )  and Arcelus and Meltzer ( 197 5)
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have demonstrated that enough tampering with the specification (period 
dummies, time trends, adding and deleting variables without rbyme or 
reason) and odd choice of variables can destroy these findings. In 
our view, however, a judicious summary of the empirical literature 
might run: A one percent decline in real income will cost the 
incumbent party between one-half and one percent of its vote share in 
the last election. 
We lack, at present , any clear sense of how particular aspects 
of economic performance�unemployment and inflation, for example� 
contribute to electoral outcomes. The aggregate studies offer 
conflicting evidence on their effects. Some find unemployment, others 
inflation, some both , others neither, as significant determinants of 
election outcomes and popular support for political leaders. In part, 
this reflects heterogeneity in the population, as Hibbs ( 1 97 7 ,  1 979)
has stressed, over the relative importance of full employment and 
price stability. Moreover, public attitudes on unemployment and 
inflation appear to shift over time, so there is little hope of 
resolving these issues with the aggregate time series data. 
The time series models have not been perfected to the point 
necessary to produce useful and reliable forecasts. High R2s--in the
.7 or . 8  range--tend to impress those nurtured on survey research, but 
they often provide vote forecasts with standard errors of � or more 
which do not make them very helpful in predicting election outcomes. 
This problem is confounded by the fact that time series analyses of 
retrospective voting have estimated the impact of economic conditions 
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upon changes in vote totals and not seat totals. {For a discussion of 
the shortcomings of forecasting on the basis of these sorts of models ,  
especially those which involve calculation o f  swing ratios, see 
Rivers, 1984). One task for future work in this area is to rigorously 
model those factors {e . g . , the nature of party competition within 
individual congressional districts) which determine how performance at 
the national level is translated into seat changes at the district 
level . The subsequent composition of Congress , after all, is of more 
direct consequence for public policy than the national vote total . 
3. SURVEY ANALYSES OF RETROSPECTIVE VOTING 
Time series analyses of aggregate voting and popularity data 
constitute only one part of the large body of research instigated by 
Kramer's 1971 paper . Dozens of other researchers turned instead to 
survey data for evidence on how economic concerns influence the 
choices made by individual voters in national elections with the 
intention of explaining the aggregate level time series findings . 
Implicit in most of these analyses was the assumption that survey data 
could resolve questions that the aggregate data could not, that the 
effects found in survey data were somehow more real than those in 
aggregate data since they were not subject to the "ecological 
fallacy , "  and that, equipped with the right survey questions , we could 
uncover the psychological motivations underlying electoral behavior . 
In fact,  for the most part survey analyses have provided very limited 
and partial answers to the questions posed. Interesting hypotheses 
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have been propo sed, but theoretical progress has been slow . 
Since 1956 , the American National Election studies have 
included an item which has frequently been used as a micro-level 
measure of real income change: 
We are interested in how people are getting along financially 
these days . Would you say that you {and your family) are better 
off or worse off financially than you were a year ago , or about 
the same? 
Most survey-based investigations have proceeded on the basis that 
evidence of retrospective voting at the individual level would consist 
of voters in the "better off" category exhibiting greater support for 
inct1mbents than. those in the "worse off" category and with those in 
the "same" category falling somewhere in be tween. Aggregate changes 
in real income are the sum of individual household changes which 
should be reflected by responses to this item. Incumbents' loss of 
electoral support during recessions would result from the fact that 
larger numbers of people were suffering financial hardships {and 
ending up in the "worse off" category) . 
What we have here is , in its simplest form , a linear 
aggregation problem . Suppose vit is a measure of the ith voter's 
support for the incumbent administration at time t {which we will 
refer to, for convenience , as his or her vote, though the measure will 
be treated as continuous rather than discrete) and let xit denote the 
change in the voter's income {usually real disposable income) in the 
period prior to the election. The assumed micro model for 
retrospective voting is : 
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vit = pxit + uit ( 1) 
where uit captures the effects of all other variables on voting . Let 
vt , xt' and ut denote the averages of vit' xit' and uit over all 
voters in election t .  Then i t  follows directly from ( 1) that : 
vt = pxt + ut ( 2) 
If ui t  and xit are uncorrelated during election t ,  then the cross­
sectional estimate of p obtained from ( 1) will be consistent . If ut 
and xt are uncorrelated over a certain time period, then the time 
series estimate of p from ( 2) will also be consistent . That is , under 
these conditions, the cross-sectional ( micro) estimates and the time 
series ( macro) estimates should not conflict . There are , however , 
several reasons why the micro and macro estimates might differ . The 
most obvious reason, which we will return to later , is that either ( 1) 
or ( 2) is misspecified in the sense that x and u ar.e correlated. We 
temporarily ignore this possibility and proceed on the assumption that 
( 1) is the correct micro speci fication. 
The survey evidence on the effect of personal financial 
conditions on voting is mixed . Votes for president do appear to 
reflect people's recent financial fortunes . With only a few 
exceptions, those who reported being better off financially were found 
to be more likely to vote for the incumbent party in presidential 
elections than those who reported being worse off or the same (Wides, 
1 97 6; Fiorina , 1 97 8 ,  1 981; Klorman, 1 978; Tufte, 1 97 8; Kinder and 
Kiewiet ,  1 97 9 , 1 981; Kiewiet ,  1 983 ) .  Similarly , the more favorable 
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recent trends i n  family finances have been, the higher the marks 
individuals give to the president for his handling of the economy 
(Fiorina , 1 9 81) and for the overall job he is doing as president 
( Wide s ,  1976; Kinder, 1 981 ) .  Much weaker effects or even no effects 
at all were found in election for other office s .  Although a few 
studies found evidence for personal financial effects in the 1 950s , 
few congressional elections after 1960 registered this effect ( Ben­
Gera, 1 97 7; Fiorina, 197 8; Kinder and Kiewiet, 1 97 9 ,  1981 ; 
Weatherford, 1 97 9) .  Nor was the evidence more supportive in either 
senatorial or gubernatorial elections ( Ben-Gera, 1 977; Klorman, 1978) . 
Several problems of interpretation plague most cross-sectional 
analyses . First,  a tendency to "control " for other attitudinal 
variables which may also depend on economic conditions leads to an 
underestimate of economic effects . Second, beyond reporting that the 
coefficient of the family finances item was statistically signi ficant 
or not , most studies have paid little attention to the meaning of the 
estimated coefficients . Estimates of , for example, the effect of a 
percent change in real income have not been computed, so although the 
cross-sectional estimates have generally been viewed as inconsistent 
with the aggregate time series estimates , no serious systematic 
attempt has been made to compare the two . 
The use of the survey personal finances item , of course, does 
not permit direct comparisons of cross-sectional estimates with the 
time-series estimates discussed in the previous section. In fact , the 
meaning of the personal finances i tem is a matter of considerable 
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controversy . Rosenstone et al . ( 1983 ) report correlations ranging 
from 0 .16 to 0 .57 between it and other more specific personal 
financial items , so , despite the question's rather vague wording , it 
does appear to measure concrete aspects of the respondent's financial 
situation. 3 It is also the case that high rates of real income growth 
are associated with larger fractions of the population reporting 
themselves to be "better off" financially as illustrated by the 
scatterplot in Figure 1 .  Regressing the percentages responding 
"better," "same , " and "worse" on the quarterly percentage rate of 
growth of real personal disposable income per capita ( annualized) ,  we 
obtain: 
A 
R2 = 0 .51 BETTER = 3 1 . 9  + 1 .3 ..UNC 
( 0 . 4) 
A 
R2 = 0 .03 SAME 
= 3 7  .8 + 0 . 5 AINC 
( 0 .9) 
A 
R2 = 0 . 21 WORSE = 3 0 .2 - 1 . 8  AINC 
( 1 .1) 
T = 13 ( 1956-1 980) ( Standard errors in parentheses) 
The responses to the personal finances item vary over a relatively 
narrow range for the most part and , when the two extreme observations 
( 1964 and 1974) are deleted, only a tenuous correlation remains 
between it and the real income growth rate . This suggests that only 
when times are bad enough to become a topic of general conversation 
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will declines in real income be reflected in the survey item and that 
it is a rather crude instrument for measuring smaller income 
fluctuations. Clearly the personal finances item measures real income 
change rather imprecisely which means that survey-based estimates of 
retrospective voting models are biased . In the simple case of 
equation ( 1 ) ,  the direction of the bias is toward zero with the degree 
of attenuation proportional to the squared correlation between the 
personal finances item and the micro-level changes in real income . 
Neglecting the unreliability of the personal financial 
situation item as a measure of real income change , Table 1 reports an 
estimate of the effect of a one percent change in real income based on 
the regression reported above and Iiewiet's ( 1983 ) presidential vote 
equations. 4 The income effects range from a 0 .0 8  loss in the 
incumbent party vote share to a 0 .3 4  loss for every percentage point 
decline in real income . On average the estimated vote loss for a one 
percent real income decline is about 0.2�.  Not only are the estimated 
effects small relative to those found in the aggregate time series 
studies , but the estimates are unstable .  ( Similar calculations could 
be made for congressional elections , but the estimates are frequently 
perversely signed so that the exercise would be pointless . )  
Various explanations have been proposed t o  account for the 
discrepancies between the cross-sectional and time series estimates . 
One approach employed to find a micro-level foundation for the 
aggregate relationship between economic conditions and voting was to 
Year 
1956
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
a. 
TABLE 1.
CROSS-SECTIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF 
PERSONAL FINANCES ON VOTING 
Personal Finances Real. Personal Incumbent Vote 
Disposable Income Loss for 1., Real 
Better Same Worse Growth Rate Income Declinea 
39 42 18 .3 .o 0.34
33 47 20 o.o 0.09
46 40 1S 5.6 0.08
34 47 20 2.8 0.19
36 42 23 3.3 '0.25
34 35 31 3.0 0.20
32 25 42 -1.0 0.18
See footnote 5 for explanation. 
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identify subsets o f  voters whose political behavior was more sensitive 
to their personal economic situation. Weatherford ( 1978) found that 
working class voters who had just experienced the hardship of a 
recession composed just such a group . In a study discussed earlier , 
Hibbing and Alford (1981) argue that incumbent congressmen of the 
president's party are more easily credited or blamed by voters in 
their districts for fluctuations in their personal economic 
conditions . Finally, according to Feldman ( 1982 ) ,  voters' decisions 
in presidential elections reflect the state of their families' 
finances only to the extent "there is a perception of social 
( economic, governmental) responsibility for financial well-being" 
( p .  449) . Most of these studies are based on data from one or two 
elections, so there is some doubt about the generalizability of their 
findings (Fiorina , 1 983 ) .  In any event , even if these findings are to 
be believed , in no way do they resolve the discrepancy between the 
cross-sectional and time series estimates . That they have identified 
groups of voters for whom personal economic considerations are 
relatively more important in deciding how to vote has to be balanced 
against the fact that each of these groups of voters constitute a 
distinct minority of the electorate. 
Probably the most interesting feature of these studies , 
however , is that they all share the same key assumption that economic 
conditions influence voting decisions only to the extent that voters 
attribute responsibility for these conditions to incumbent 
politicians . In each of these studies the pattern of evidence which 
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i s  reported is interpreted i n  terms of the differential attribution of 
responsibility . Thus , voters' decisions in presidential elections are 
influenced much more strongly by trends in family finances because the 
president is assigned the lion's share of credit or blame : 
It is the president who is primarily responsible-for the general 
thrust of macroeconomic policy, whether it be the "guns and 
butter" policies of Lyndon Johnson or the "Reaganomics " of the 
current administration. It is also the president who shoulders 
most of the credit or blame for the ultimate success or failure 
of the policies pursued by his administration. Consequently, any 
sort of economic problem which voters might be concerned about 
will exert a larger influence upon their choice between 
presidential candidates than upon that between the candidates for 
Congress (Kiewiet, 1 983 , p .  126) . 
Hibbing and Alford also point to differential attributions of 
responsibility to account for the greater influence of economic 
concerns in elections involving incumbent incumbents : 
If anyone is held responsible for current financial conditions , 
it should be those who are in the best position to take credit or 
receive blame for these conditions--that is senior incumbents of 
the in-party incumbents, those gradations should be related in 
some positive fashion to tenure ( Hibbing and Al ford, 1981 , p .  
43 5).  
Feldman ( 1982 )  invokes the same line of reasoning : 
Personal economic conditions will influence voting behavior only 
when there is a perception of social ( economic , governmental) 
responsibility for financial well-being (Feldman, 1 982 , p .  449) . 
In short, the assumption that economic conditions influence voting 
decisions only to the extent that voters attribute responsibility for 
these conditions to incumbent politicians is ubiquitous in this 
20 
literature. That this is so, however , raises the crucial question of 
exactly how such attributions should be modeled . 
More precisely , do voters , having experienced a stream of 
economic outcomes, attempt to discriminate between that part of it 
which is properly attributable to the actions of incumbent 
policymakers and that part of it which is not? Or do they simply take 
this stream of outcomes at face value and evaluate the incumbents more 
or less favorably on the basis of it? Strict notions of voter 
rationality would certainly suggest that they would attempt to 
differentiate between income chacge which is "government-induced " and 
that which is not; after all, why should an individual choose between 
competing candidates on the basis of things that neither could 
possibly control? On the other hand, this task may well place large 
information costs and unreasonable demands on the inferential powers 
of the typical voter. The avoidance of these costs was one of the 
major features of Downs' ( 1957) model of retrospective voting. 
Similarly, Butler and S tokes ( 1969) argue that "the technical 
difficulties of assigning responsibility for past government action or 
inaction" force voters to adopt a satisficing strategy : 
Modern electorates tend to "solve" this problem of causal 
reasoning by assuming that certain causal relationships must 
exist rather than by discerning what they are . Electors focus 
their attention primarily on certain conditions which they value 
positively or negatively and simply assume that past or future 
governments affect them . The public can call for a government's 
dismissal in economic hard times just as it calls for a team 
manager's dismissal in a losing season, in each case concluding 
that causal relationships must exist without knowing in detail 
what they are ( p .  2 5). 
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But are such distinctions really so difficult to make? There 
are many predictable chacges in a person's financial situation over 
the life cycle which voters understand and anticipate . Some are 
favorable and improve one's financial state ( e . g . , finishing graduate 
school and taking a full-time teaching position) while others decrease 
one's income ( e .g . , having a child enter college or retiring) .  It 
seems far-fetched that voters would credit the incumbent party for 
changes of this kind . Or to give a more extreme example : suppose a 
distant relative dies , leaving a substantial inheritance. Does the 
lucky recipient attribute his or her good fortune to whoever happens 
to be in the White House at that moment? 
Moreover , there is a good deal of evidence that voters rarely 
associate chacges in their personal financial situation with 
government policy . When asked l!!hI. their family financial situation 
had changed, Kinder and Mebane ( 1983) report that "virtually no one 
sees government policy contributing to their family's economic 
achievements or setbacks . In any single national survey , no more than 
1� of those interviewed point directly to government .- This is not to 
say that voters place BQ responsibility on government for their 
personal economic fortunes, but only that not all changes in a family 
finances have political effects . Schlozman and Verba's ( 1981) 
interviews with several hundred unemployed individuals yielded very 
similar findings , as did Brody and Sniderman's ( 1977a,  1977b) studies 
of "coping" and the ethic of sel f-reliance . 
The question of whether or not voters hold government 
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responsible for all changes in their personal financial situation 
concerns the specification of equation ( 1) .  Kramer ( 1 9 83 )  argues that 
voters respond not to changes in their real income, but instead to 
government-induced changes in real income. He partitions the change 
in a voter's real income xit into a component git which can be 
attributed to the actions of the incumbent government and an 
idiosyncratic component eit : 
xit = git + eit
Kramer does not claim that voters are able to precisely distinguish 
( 3) 
which fraction of tbeir income change is actually government-induced ,  
but only that some substantial part o f  the change i n  a family's 
financial situation is caused by forces clearly outside the 
government's control . 
Replacing xit by git in ( 1) yields : 
vit = pgit + uit
If (4) is the correct specification for the vote equation ( i.e . , if 
( 4) 
git and uit are uncorrelated) , then the cross-sectional estimate of p 
obtained by regressing vote on change in family income will ( under the 
conditions of White , 1 982) converges to: 
[var (gitl + cov (git'eit>] cov ( uit' eitl p• 
= 
p 
-- + . var (xit> var (xitl 
with probability one as sample size increases. 
( 5) 
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From ( 5) there are several obvious sources of bias in the 
cross-sectional estimates : 
1 .  If the government is responsible for a relatively small 
fraction of the cross-sectional variation in family finances,  
then var (git> < var (xit>· 
2 .  If government-induced income changes tend to compensate for 
nongovernment-induced income changes ,  then cov ( git' eit) < O. 
3 .  If uit includes party or other effects on voting which are 
correlated with nongovernment-induced income changes , then 
the sign of cov ( uit' eitl will vary from sample to sample , 
depending on, among other things , which party is in power at 
the time of the sample. 
The first two effects discussed above will bias the cross-sectional 
estimates downward ( i. e . , toward zero ) .  The third effect can bias the 
cross-sectional estimates either upward or downward. but , in any 
event , will make the estimates vary from one cross-section to another. 
Kramer argues that these biases account for the findings of the 
cross-sectional studies reviewed above: unstable coefficient 
estimates which , on average , are somewhat smaller than those found in 
aggregate time-series studies. 
Whether retrospective voting should be specified as a function 
of total income change (xit> or government-induced income change (git> 
is seen to be a question of central importance . If the latter 
specification is the correct one , then absence of income effects found 
in many cross-sectional studies is no more than a statistical 
artifact .  I t  will be difficult to resolve this issue with current 
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survey measures . Nor is posing a question to survey respondents such 
as "What percentage of the increase or decrease in your income over 
the past year do you attribute to the effects of government policy?• 
likely to be very informative. Such calculations, if they occur at 
all, are probably subconscious and the survey responses may be tainted 
by rationalization. The most promising strategy in our view would be 
to identify�as objectively as possible--different sources of income 
change and then to estimate the separate effect of each type of income 
change on voting . 
In view of the poor results obtained with the personal 
finances item, attention has shifted to other forms of economic 
effects that might provide a link between micro and macro-level 
findings . The sociotropic voting hypothesis of Kinder and Kiewiet 
( 1 97 9 ,  1 981) is one effort in this direction. They argued that it is 
difficult for individuals in this country to disentangle the effect of 
current governmental policies upon their own economic fortunes from a 
whole host of other factors which affect the demand for their labor 
and the value of their assets . The state of the nation' s  economy , 
however, reflects upon the performance of the incumbent party in a far 
more direct fashion: 
Conditions in the national economy , of course , are probably not 
as personally salient to most individuals as their own financial 
situation. But national economic assessments are, by definition, 
of general, widespread phenomena. Consequently, in most people's 
minds national economic conditions reflect upon the performance 
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and policies of the incumbent administration much more directly 
than the conditions of their own lives • • • what national 
economic assessments lack in personal relevance, they make up for 
by being of more obvious political relevance (Kiewiet, 1 983, p .  
130) • 
Their hypothesis is that perceptions of national economic conditions 
and events determine the degree to which voters support incumbent 
candidates . In other words , the aggregate level time series findings 
were generated not so much by voters responding to their own 
individual economic circumstances, but rather by their response to the 
aggregate level economic data themselves . Kinder and Kiewiet's 
analyses were based primarily upon responses to a question which 
closely resembled the family finances item: 
Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole, 
would you say that at the present time business conditions are 
better or worse than they were a year ago, or about the same? 
Employing a fairly simple model, they found that the more favorably 
voters viewed recent trends in national business conditions, the 
higher the probabil ity of their voting for incumbent candidates. As 
with the family finances measure, however, the influence of this 
variable upon voting decisions was considerably stronger in 
presidential elections than in congressional races .  
It i s  also the case that the distribution of responses t o  the 
national business conditions item swing much more sharply between good 
years and bad years than the distribution of responses to the family 
finances item . Furthermore, the results of Kiewiet's (1983) 
simulations indicated that voting on the basis of recent trends in 
national business conditions could account for roughly twice as much 
variation in the level of support received by incumbent presidential 
and congressional candidates than voting in response to shifting 
family financial fortunes . He calculated that the effects of both 
variables taken together accounted for about hal f of the aggregate 
change in votes implied by Kramer's and Fair's findings . 
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Analyses of sociotropic voting are also, as Kramer ( 19 83) has 
pointed out , subject to serious problems of evidence and 
interpretation. If a strict interpretation of the sociotropic 
hypothesis is taken. then the relevant variable is either the average 
income change (xt) or its government-induced counterpart (denoted Gt 
in Kramer's analysis) .  Neither o f  these variables varies i n  a cross­
section. so it is hopeless to obtain any evidence about this form of 
sociotropic voting from a cross-sectional analysis .  Any observed 
cross-sectional variation, according to Kramer , will reflect either 
measurement error in the survey instrument or differences in voter 
perceptions . 
We suspect that cross-sectional variation in perceptions of 
national economic trends arises from many sources. Some of it will 
just be partisan rationalization, but some of it may reflect different 
sources of information available to voters . For example. in depressed 
areas voters may perceive national conditions to be worse than voters 
in booming areas . 5 Other variation may depend on the specific form of 
voters' utility functions . Different individuals may focus on 
different economic indicators , weight the same indicators differently , 
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or exhibit different rates of time preference . Having acknowledged 
that survey measures of national economic conditions may be more than 
an amalgamation of rationalization and measurement error , we should 
caution that we have very little understanding of precisely what they 
do measure (see Kiewiet. 1983 , ch . 6). 
The second major difficulty with analyzing sociotropic voting 
is one of interpretation. Kiewiet ( 1 983, p .  131) points out that 
"voting in response to national economic assessments could reflect 
very different motivations . It could have its basis in a purely 
patriotic or altruistic concern for the interests of all Americans. 
Alternatively. it could be entirely motivated by a sel f-interested 
concern for one's economic well-being; in this case voters simply use 
information about national economic conditions as an indicator of bow 
well the incumbent administration bas promoted their own (and their 
fellow citizens') welfare . "  In fact , if voters wish to evaluate 
incumbent performance on the basis of government-induced changes in 
their own income, the national average real income change provides a 
reasonable basis to distinguish idiosyncratic income changes from 
those which are government induced . Voters' responses to the national 
economic conditions question may therefore be a better indicator of 
their estimate of government-induced income change in their personal 
income than the personal finances item . 
4 .  POOLING CROSS-SECTIONS AND TIME SERIES 
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The data problems which trouble cross-sectional analyses of 
retrospective voting are not solely statistical in nature. Inasmuch 
as the performance indicators used to estimate retrospective voting 
models are subject to error , the nature of this error is very 
different in the cross-section than in the time series. More 
specifically, government policy will cause different kinds of income 
change in cross-sections and time series. Depending upon where one 
learned their macroeconomics , national output and employment levels 
are either viewed as quite sensitive to fiscal and monetary policies 
(Kramer , having spent some time at the Cowles Commission, attributes 
roughly hal f the variance in the rate of real income growth to 
government policy) or as completely irrelevant (as is bel ieved in some 
sectors of Chicago and Minneapolis) . 
However, one stands on the new classical macroeconomics , all 
can agree that the government redistributes income among citizens in 
myriad ways : taxes, transfers, regulation, inflation, etc . In the 
cross-section, all of the government induced income variation is of 
the redistributive variety. As indicated earlier, Kramer argues that 
this variation makes up a relatively small fraction of the change in 
incomes for individuals in any period . Moreover , knowing that an 
individual is the beneficiary of a particular government 
redistributive policy will also indicate the likely partisanship of 
that individual . This relationship will not be stable over time or 
across party administrations ( more Democrats receive wel fare benefits 
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than oil depreciation allowances, so changing one policy af'fects 
Democrats and Republicans differently) and, as a consequence , little 
systematic can be learned from the personal finances item in a cross­
section. By aggregating , Kramer argues, it is possible to average out 
most idiosyncratic and redistributive income effects .  
One hypothesis that has not been investigated here is that 
voting on aggregate performance and individual redistribution are of a 
different character . 6 It seems quite plausible that voting based on 
aggregate performance might be incumbency-oriented; that is, voters 
could ignore the policies used to achieve macroeconomic goals ,  support 
any ones which seem to work, and oppose any which fail . After all, 
both parties claim to.have the secret to macroeconomic success and i f  
economists can't agree o n  who is right, why should voters try? O n  
redistributional issues, however, the parties do take different 
positions and voters have little difficulty determining which policies 
benefit them . It would be unwise for the recipients of government 
benefits to indiscriminately credit the incumbent party�which may be 
trying to cut those benefits�for its supposed largesse . Aggregate 
performance level s would indicate the skill of the incumbent party , 
while redistributional effects would represent the policy position 
taken by the incumbent party . A purely sel f-interested voter might 
prefer a less-skilled party which was willing to redistribute income 
in his or her direction (see Rivers , 1983 ,  for analysis of a model of 
this type). 
Combining cross-section and time-series data permits ,  in 
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principle, investigation of these and other interesting hypotheses .  
Rosenstone ( 1983 ) , for example, has improved o n  aggregate electoral 
forecasts by disaggregating to the state level in a pooled cross­
sectional analysi s .  Markus ( 1984) has tried pooling seven of the 
Michigan surveys to test the so-called sel f-interest and sociotropic 
voting hypotheses and, before long, many others will probably turn to 
pooling cross-sections in the face of the Kramer critique . While 
panel data7 is potentially quite useful for some questions, it is 
important to understand what it po ssibly can or cannot tell us. It is 
shown in the appendix to this paper that the pooled cross-section 
regression estimate is a weighted average of the relevant cross­
section estimates and the aggregate time-series estimate . Since, 
under Kramer's assumptions, both the cross-sectional and time series 
estimates are biased toward the origin, the pooled cross-section 
estimate wil l also be biased since it lies in the convex hull of these 
estimates . In fact, if ( as is the case) the typical cross-sectional 
variation in real income growth is larger than the average time-series 
variation, the pooled cross-section estimate will lie closer to the 
average cross-section estimate than to the time-series estimate . 
Hence, no progress has been made toward alleviating the errors in 
variables problem by pooling, nor as yet do we have a feasible way of 
attacking cross-sectional and time-series issues simultaneously . 
Pooling, as Hausman and Taylor ( 1981) have shown, can provide a 
natural solution to the errors-in-variables problem, but this requires 
an explicit treatment of measurement errors that has not yet been 
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attempted i n  retrospective voting models .  
S. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? 
The cautionary tone of our survey should not be taken as 
unduly pessimistic . The retrospective voting literature has raised, 
we think, a large number of interesting questions about the 
relationship between elections and public policy . If the answers 
which have been obtained are partial and limited, there is nonetheless 
an identifiable body of findings contained in this literature. The 
growth of knowledge about retrospective voting has been facilitated by 
the existence of a simple,  clearly specified model . Difficulties have 
arisen when some concepts have not been clearly defined or when the 
relationship between empirical measures (particularly survey measures) 
and theoretical concepts have been treated too casually . 
Further progress is unlikely to come by continued mining of 
the same types of data in traditional ways . More promising, in our 
view, will be efforts to identify new sources and types of data that 
are potentially informative about outstanding theoretical issues. I f  
a variable o f  interest, national economic conditions for example, does 
not vary in a particular sample (in a cross-section for example), one 
must resort to another source of data (such as panel data) . The new 
source of data will not be automatically free of the problems of the 
old data (such as measurement error, as discussed in Section 4) and it 
may entail new problems (eg . ,  sample selection bias) that could be 
ignored before. While we do not believe that attempts to solve these 
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problems are guaranteed to be successful, the continued vitality of 
research in this area depends on the attempts being made. 
The other major problem facing those interested in 
retrospective voting is one of interpretation. By now the proposition 
that voters will punish imcumbents for poor performance should not be 
controversial. Attempts to elaborate upon this relationship may, 
however, raise interpretive issues that will require reformulation of 
the simple retrospective voting model or its extension to behaviors 
other than voting. For example, partisan voting was frequently viewed 
as a competitor of the retrospective voting hypothesis until Fiorina 
(1981) showed how partisanship naturally fitted within the 
retrospective voting framework. This makes the interpretation of 
party effects within these models as problematic, particularly in a 
field where it has been routine practice to "control" for party 
identification. Similarly, we have argued that the existence of 
aggregate economic effects on individual political behavior are 
consistent with either self-interested or sociotropic voting. In this 
case, it may be necessary to examine behavior on other issues where 
different decision processes can be more easily distinguished.8 Here,
too, we believe the issues raised in the retrospective voting 
literature are important and worthy of further attention. 
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APPENDIX 
Let i = 1, • • • •  N index the observations in samples t 1, • • .  ,T 
so that (xt,yt) composes the data from sample t with
xt = <x1t•····xNt), and Yt <Y1t••···YNt) '. (The restriction that
the samples be of the same size is unnecessary and can easily be 
eliminated.) Let x = (x� , • • •  ,x;)' and y = (y�, •••• y;)' and define the
orthogonal projection operators: 
1 , PN = N 1N1N � IN - PN
where lN denotes 
-
[
N 
yt = (1/
N) i=l
an N x 1 vector of ones. 
Yit and similarly for xt.
Note that PNyt = YtlN where
With this notation 
established, consider the following three regressions: 
(1) Cross-section. bt = x;QNyt/x;QNxt (t
( 2) Average Time Series. 
1, ••• , T) 
b = x '(IT Gi) PN) QNT(IT Gi) PN) y/x '(IT Gi) PN) QNT(IT Gi) PN)x
( 3 )  Pooled Cross-section. b = x'�ty/x'QNrX 
That is, for each cross-section t = 1, . • •  ,T, Yt can be regressed on xt
- -
yielding an estimate bt. Alternatively, Yt can be regressed on xt
yielding the average time series estimate b. Instead of averaging,
the cross-sections could be pooled and the NT observations used to 
produce the pooled cross-section estimate b. (@denotes the Kronecker 
product.) It is easily verified that: 
QNT = (ITGi)QN) + <Or@PN)
Using QtrN = 0 gives : 
so that : 
CIT ® PN) QNT(IT ® PN) � ® PN 
b = :x'(�@ PN)y/x ' (�@ PN)x 
With some rearrangement and substitution we find : 
T , T , 
b = [bx'(� ® PN)x + ) bt(xtQrt> l /Cx'(� (i) PN)x + [ xtQNxt]t=1 t=l 
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We have shown that the pooled cross-section estimator b is a weighted 
average of the average time series estimator b and the T cross-section 
estimates b1, • . .  ,bT :
where : 
T 
b = w0b
+ 
[ 
wtbtt=l 
WO
:-2 
T 2 2 Ts /( 
[ 
st + Ts )t=l 
wt 
2 T 2 -2 st/( [ st + Ts ) t=l 
T 
( 
[ 
wt = 1 , wt 2 O for all  t)t=O 
(t 1 ,  • • •  , T) 
Where s� is the variance of x in sample t and ;2 is the variance of x,
i .e .  
s2 1 
T -
r [ <x - x>
2
t=l 
t 
1 T 
-
x = -
[ 
xt .Tt=l 
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NOTES 
1 .  Fiorina (1983) performs a test of equality for the coefficients of 
the "Better, "  "Same, " and "Worse" dummies in Democratic, open, and 
Republican seats . Apart from problems with the survey data 
covered later, Fiorina' s  test lacks power since it involves open 
seats and voters whose financial position is unchanged which are 
peripheral to the Hibbing-Alford hypothesis.  In fact, Fiorina' s  
estimates provide some support for the different treatment of 
incumbents in midterm but not in presidential election years . 
2 .  Approximately 9S'li confidence intervals listed in parentheses . 
Most articles cited below report a variety of specifications with 
a corresponding range of estimates . The estimates reported here 
are selected to be representative of the results reported . 
Readers are encouraged to refer to the original papers rather than 
rely on our somewhat subjective summary . 
3 .  The variable most highly correlated with the personal finances 
item is the reported direction of income change relative to the 
cost of living . For reasons not apparent to us, political 
scientists tend to prefer questions with better/worse response 
categories to, for example, reported dollar amounts of income 
change . Even if respondents do not know exactly how much their 
income has changed, it is difficult to see how forcing them into 
vague response categories will reduce measurement error. 
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4 .  Kiewiet (1983 )  reports probit estimates of the form : 
Prob (Republican Vote) = f>[p ( Better) + y ( Worse ) + other terms ] 
If we evaluate the above expression for a voter whose personal 
financial situation is unchanged ( i . e . , Better = Worse = 0) and 
se t the "other terms" equal to zero, then we have (approximately) : 
Prob (Republican Vote) = 0 .5 + P C 0 . 4) ( Better) + y ( 0 .4) (Worse ) 
using an approximation suggested by Amemiya ( 1981) • Using the 
regression estimates reported in the text , the change in the 
Republican vote share resulting from a one percent increase in the
real income growth rate can be estimated by : 
AProb(Republican Vote) Prob (Republican Vote lBetter )AProb (Better)
+ Prob (Republican Vote lSame ) AProb ( Same)
+ Prob (Republican Vote lWorse )AProb ( Worse ) 
� C 0 .4 ) C 0 .013P - o .01 8y)
The approximate change in the incumbent party ( rather than 
Republican) vote share is reported in the text . 
5 .  This suggests using the state unemployment rate as another 
indicator for the business conditions item in an errors-in­
variables model . 
6 .  The distinction between incumbent-oriented and policy-oriented 
voting is discussed in Kiewiet ( 1981 ) . Instead of blaming the 
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incumbents for all forms o f  economic difficulties , policy-oriented 
voters support the party which places a higher priority on 
attacking the problems they find most worrisome . Assuming 
Democrats place higher priority on full employment and Republicans 
on price stability ( Hibbs , 1 97 7 ) , policy-oriented voting in 
response to inflation would result in more support for the 
Republicans, while concern over unemployment would help Democratic 
candidates , regardless of who the incumbents happened to be .  
7 .  For static model s without unobservable individual effects, 
repeated independent cross-sections are equivalent to a panel . 
8 .  Gerald Kramer has suggested that preferences over tax schedules 
would be a situation where sociotropic behavior can be easily 
distinguished from narrowly self-interested behavior . 
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